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Abstract
Consider a rm that would like to commit to a focused business strategy because
focus improves e¢ ciency and thus increases prot. We identify two general conditions
under which tougher competition strengthens the rms ability to commit to a focused
strategy. Under these conditions, competition fosters commitment for two reasons: (i)
competition reduces the value of the option to diversify (the contestability e¤ect) and
(ii) competition increases the importance of being e¢ cient (the e¢ ciency e¤ect). We
use a number of di¤erent models of imperfect competition to illustrate the applicability
of our results. Our examples suggest that the contestability e¤ect is very general. In
contrast, the e¢ ciency e¤ect often requires further conditions, which are specic to the
nature of competition in each model. In both cases, our analysis helps us predict when
these e¤ects are more likely to be observed.
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1. Introduction
Economic theories of business strategy often emphasize the importance of commitment.
Commitment is important not only because of its competitive and entry-deterrence e¤ects
(e.g., Ghemawat, 1991) but also because it a¤ects a rms internal incentive structure (e.g.,
Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994; Van den Steen, 2005). In particular, by committing to a
strategy, a rm may be able to incentivize employees to undertake strategy-specic invest-
ments in human capital or, similarly, to attract workers who possess such skills. However,
such incentives can only work if employees are su¢ ciently condent that their investments
are aligned with the rms strategy. A natural question is then: How can rms commit to a
given strategy?
This paper discusses the role of product market competition as one such commitment
mechanism. We develop a framework that helps us to understand when more competition
enhances a rms ability to commit to a focused strategy. Our key result is the identication
of two general conditions under which competitive pressure enhances a rms ability to
commit.
To understand the logic underlying our results, consider a rm that will have (or already
has) an opportunity to operate in two segments (or markets): A and B. An example is
a focused rm considering broadening its scope, perhaps because of growth opportunities.
Alternatively, the rm could be a diversied rm considering the possibility of exiting one
segment, perhaps because its management believes that the rm can be more e¢ cient if it
is focused. In either case, at some future date, the rm has to decide whether to be focused
and operate only in A or to be diversied and operate in both A and B. If the rm chooses
the focused strategy, its employees will have incentives to undertake investments (in human
or organization capital) that are specic to segment A. However, such specic investments
require employees to believe that the rm will focus on A. If the rm is unable to commit
to the focused strategy, employees may not wish to undertake such investments, as strategy-
specic skills are less valuable if the rm chooses the diversied strategy. This is essentially
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the commitment problem studied in Rotemberg and Saloner (1994).
Suppose now that we introduce competition by allowing for potential entry in segments
A and/or B. Potential entry has two e¤ects. First, entry reduces prots in B, making
the diversied strategy less attractive for the incumbent rm. Second, the threat of entry
provides the incumbent with entry-deterrence incentives to focus on A, as by focusing on A,
the rm can make better use of the skills acquired by its workers and become more e¢ cient
(e.g., have lower costs) than the potential entrants. Both e¤ects increase the likelihood
that the incumbent will choose the focused strategy (that is, A). Thus, if competition is
su¢ ciently strong, employees rationally choose to undertake A-specic investments.
An interesting implication of this simple model is that an incumbents prots may in-
crease with the threat of entry in its industry, and even a monopolist can benet from such a
threat. This apparently counter-intuitive result is easily understood once one considers the
commitment e¤ect of competition. Increased competition can eventually solve the dynamic
inconsistency problem associated with the choice of business strategies. When it does, the
rm may be better o¤ due to the positive e¤ects of competition on segment-specic invest-
ments.
We use this simple threat-of-entry modelas our main example. This particular example
illustrates the main results, but it leaves open the question of whether these ideas have
broader applicability. In particular, competitionand competitive pressurehave di¤erent
meanings in di¤erent models; thus it is natural to ask whether our analysis also applies to
alternative models and notions of competition. With this issue in mind, after presenting
our main example, we develop a reduced-form model in which competition is not explicitly
modeled. Precisely because competition is modeled in reduced form, the model is fairly
general. Within this framework, we identify two necessary and su¢ cient conditions that
give rise to the two e¤ects illustrated above.
The rst e¤ect is observed whenever tougher competition in segment B leads to lower
prots in that segment, which then reduces the value of the option to diversify. Conse-
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quently, as competition in that segment intensies, the rm is more likely to pursue the
focused strategy. We call this the contestability e¤ect. An interesting testable implication
of the contestability e¤ect is that a rm operating in one segment becomes more e¢ cient if
competition increases in other segments.
The second e¤ect is observed whenever tougher competition in segment A makes invest-
ment in that segment more valuable. In the example above, A-specic investments reduce
costs and help to deter entry. More generally, if focused rms are more e¢ cient and thus
better able to thrive under intense competition, commitment to a focused strategy may be
more credible under more intense competition. We call this the e¢ ciency e¤ect. The e¢ -
ciency e¤ect requires more stringent conditions than the contestability e¤ect. Intuitively, the
e¢ ciency e¤ect has to contend with an opposing force: If competition su¢ ciently reduces
prots in segment A, the rm gains little from specializing in that segment and thus any
promise to focus on A has little credibility. Thus, for the e¢ ciency e¤ect to dominate this
latter e¤ect, competition must not have a very strong negative e¤ect on the prots of a
focused rm.
Our analysis is intentionally vague regarding the denition of competitive pressure.
After we present the main example and our main results, we discuss a number of additional
examples in which competition is modeled explicitly. Using di¤erent standard models of
imperfect competition, we consider four di¤erent notions of competitive pressure: (i) threat
of entry (the main example), (ii) the number of rival rms in the industry, (iii) product
substitutability, and (iv) mode of competition (price versus quantity competition). We
demonstrate that the contestability e¤ect holds in all models that we consider, regardless
of the denition of competitive pressure. The e¢ ciency e¤ect is also present in all of these
models, but it often requires further conditions. Our examples illustrate the characteristics
of the industries where the e¢ ciency e¤ect is likely to be of rst-order importance: (i) the
presence of few incumbent rivals, (ii) high product substitutability, and (iii) a signicant
threat of entry.
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We conclude the paper with an extension in which the rm may choose between a exible
(or ex post prot-maximizing) and a committed (or visionary) CEO. This extension allows
us to link our analysis to the leadership literature (for surveys of the most recent literature,
see Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp, 2010, and Hermalin, 2012). We nd that a leaders
ability to commit is a less important managerial trait in highly competitive environments.
The reason for this result is that competitive pressure and vision(in the terminology of
Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000, and Van den Steen, 2005) or resoluteness (in the termi-
nology of Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp, 2013) are both alternative mechanisms for
conferring credibility to a focused strategy.
A Motivating Example. Although our model is not inspired by any particular com-
pany, its components and many of its conclusions can be motivated by, and are consistent
with, the case of Intel Corporation and the choices it faced in 1984-85 (see Burgelman, 1994,
and Casadeus-Masanell, Yo¢ e, and Mattu, 2010). Before its exit from the dynamic random
access memory (DRAM) business in 1985, Intel was an active player in both the market for
DRAM and the market for microprocessors. Although the production of each required sim-
ilar competencies (e.g., competencies in line-width reduction), DRAMs required relatively
more expertise in manufacturing (e.g., low-cost production) and less expertise in product
design (e.g., mastering design complexity) than microprocessors. By the early 1980s, Intel
found it increasingly di¢ cult to acquire a competitive advantage over its Japanese competi-
tors. The situation was di¤erent for microprocessors, where it was possible to create specic
capabilities in product design. By 1985, there was a clear discrepancy between Intels o¢ cial
business strategy, which was to continue to support DRAMs, and the actions of middle-level
managers. These individuals had already begun to change practices, to refocus, and to ac-
quire new expertise specic to microprocessor production. According to Burgelman (1994),
Andy Grove (then Intels COO) recalled that: By mid-1984, some middle-level managers
had made the decision to adopt new process technology which inherently favored logic [mi-
croprocessor] rather than memory advances (...).Eventually, Intels management decided
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to exit the DRAM business entirely.
This is an example of how competition can provide workers with incentives to undertake
strategy-specic investments. In this example, as the market for DRAMs became increasingly
contested, middle-managers understood that Intel would need to refocus on microprocessors
and thus began to undertake microprocessor-specic investments, even before Intel exited
the DRAM market. This is an example of the contestability e¤ect.
Another interesting observation is that Intels o¢ cial strategy was to support both prod-
ucts. Middle-managers, however, behaved as if Intel was likely to change its strategy. As in
our model, what mattered was not the o¢ cial strategy but which strategy was more likely
to be implemented given the existing competitive pressures.1
It is more di¢ cult to identify explicit examples of the e¢ ciency e¤ect. The primary
empirical implication of the e¢ ciency e¤ect that competition in a market tends to make
incumbent rms more e¢ cient is a well-documented empirical fact in the industrial orga-
nization literature (see, e.g., the survey by Holmes and Schmitz, 2010, and the discussion
in the next section). It is, however, di¢ cult to isolate the exact mechanism by which this
occurs. Separating the e¢ ciency e¤ect from other e¤ects linking competition to productivity
requires additional tests. Our analysis provides a starting point for designing such tests, as
we briey discuss in our concluding remarks. The microprocessor market at the time of
the Intel case exhibited some of the characteristics of an industry in which the e¢ ciency
e¤ect could also be found. First, we obviously need a market in which specic investments
can increase protability, and the microprocessor market had this property. Second, this
was a market with few incumbent players, with relatively high product substitutability, and
1An objection that could be raised against this interpretation is the possibility that Intels o¢ cial strat-
egy,as communicated to outsiders, di¤ered from the strategy communicated to insiders. Although we have
no way of verifying this, Burgelmans (1994) narrative of the case explicitly states that Intels top manage-
ment not only supported its o¢ cial strategy internally (in board meetings) but also that Intel promoted
this strategy through concrete actions (e.g., it maintained a high level of funding for DRAM technology
development relative to other businesses). Casadeus-Masanell, Yo¢ e, and Mattus (2010) narrative of In-
tels strategy similarly suggests that (at least some) managers working for Intel in the early 1980s did not
receive clear signals (or regarded the signals they did receive as unclear) concerning Intels future strategy
with respect to DRAMs. Again, an inability (or lack of intent) to commit to a specic strategy required
subordinates to assess the likelihood of the various options in the context of competitive pressures.
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with few or no (exogenous) barriers to entry. Our analysis reveals that all of these three
characteristics are associated with the prevalence of the e¢ ciency e¤ect.
As none of our analysis depends on a companys current market position, it equally
applies to diversied rms that are considering adopting a focused approach (such as Intel)
and to the common case of a focused rm that eventually decides to diversify, e.g., for growth
reasons.
2. Related Literature
Our model belongs to the literature initiated by Rotemberg and Saloner (1994), who discuss
the benets of committing to a narrow business strategy in a context in which workers exert
e¤ort to produce innovations.2 Because workers are only compensated if the innovations that
they discover are implemented, a rm may wish to commit to a narrow strategy to induce
e¤ort ex ante. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) propose that the employment of a CEO with a
visionis a possible solution to this commitment problem. In a similar vein, Van den Steen
(2005) demonstrates that the employment of a visionary CEO provides direction, improves
coordination, and allows the rm to attract employees with similar beliefs, who will thus be
more productive.3
A common element in this literature is the absence of competitive interactions; all of
these papers model the rm in a quasi-monopolistic setting. Naturally, then, they do not
consider the impact of product market competition on the credibility of commitment to a
particular strategy. Our contribution is to embed this commitment problem in a model in
which the rm may face di¤erent forms of competitive pressure.
In a broader sense, our paper is also related to the literature on the possible connections
2This literature is reviewed by Roberts and Saloner (2012).
3Other papers that focus on the personal characteristics of leaders as a means to provide credibility
to proposed business strategies include Rotemberg and Saloner (1993), Blanes-i-Vidal and Möller (2007),
Hart and Holmström (2010), and Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp (2013). Alternatively, Ferreira and
Rezende (2007) present a related model in which managerial career concerns operate as a commitment
mechanism.
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between product market competition and within-rm frictions that hamper productivity.
Early concerns that lack of competition may lead to ine¢ ciencies were expressed by Hicks
(1935), who famously stated that the best of all monopoly prots is a quiet life (p.8),
and Leibenstein (1966), who coined the term X-ine¢ cienciesto describe the ine¢ ciencies
arising from a rms failure to minimize costs. Modern analyses of the link between competi-
tion and internal e¢ ciency can be found in Hart (1983), Raith (2003), Schmidt (1997), and
Holmes, Levine and Schmitz (2012), among others.
To the best of our knowledge, the link between commitment and the intensity of product
market competition has not been formalized before. However, the industrial organization
(IO) literature addresses the question of how product market competition a¤ects a rms
incentives to increase productivity. A comprehensive formal treatment and review of this
related literature can be found in Vives (2008), who identies the conditions under which
an increase in the intensity of product market competition positively a¤ects the value of
a cost-reducing investment. Vives (2008) nds that such a link cannot be established in
general and depends on the specics of the respective model. Our approach is similar to his,
in the sense that we seek general conditions under which competition fosters commitment.
In particular, in Section 6, we provide examples of di¤erent models in which competition
can foster commitment. Although the models that we present are specically tailored to
our question (e.g., heterogeneous rms and discrete cost reductions), and thus di¤er from
those Vives (2008) examines, the intuition underlying some of our conditions are related to
his results, as we explain in Section 6. To the best of our knowledge, the theoretical IO
literature on competition and productivity does not study the relevance of commitment to
specic strategies or, in particular, the impact of competition on multi-market rms, both
of which are central to our analysis.4
Holmes and Schmitz (2010) provide an overview of empirical studies and cases that illus-
trate the impact of competition on productivity. Of particular interest are studies reporting
4Sutton (2012) also discusses the importance of developing specic capabilities in competitive environ-
ments.
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that competition leads to productivity improvements within rms. Further relevant to our
work are studies showing that some productivity gains can be attributed to investments in
human or organization capital. An example is Schmitz (2005), who shows that an increase
in competition driven by Brazilian iron ore producers led to productivity gains among US
and Canadian iron ore producers in the early 1980s. He also concludes that a substantial
proportion of these gains were caused by changes in work practices within rms. Although
Schmitz does not provide evidence on the mechanism linking competition to productivity
gains, he speculates that commitment problems may be among the reasons that such gains
could not be achieved in the absence of competition (see Schmitz, 2005, p. 619).5
Finally, our model is also useful for understanding rm heterogeneity. There is substan-
tial evidence that apparently similar rms display persistent di¤erences in performance (for
recent surveys, see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010, Gibbons, 2010, and Syverson, 2011). Re-
cent empirical evidence by Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2010) suggests that competition
triggers organizational change. In our model, small variations in the strength of commit-
ment can have drastic consequences for protability. Absent competition, these performance
di¤erences may be persistent.
3. Setup
We describe our model in two steps. First, we explain our modeling of the organization.
Then we describe the organizations external environment: its demand conditions and the
structure of competition.
5Recent work by Backus (2014) nds that productivity improvements in the ready-mix concrete industry
are directly caused by competition. Further evidence that competition can result in changes in work practices
within rms can be found in Holmes and Schmitz (2001) for the US shipping industry, where the emergence
of competition by railroads in the 19th century led to the adoption of more e¢ cient work rules by unions,
and in Dunne, Klimek and Schmitz (2011), who nd a similar impact of competitive pressure on work
rules in the U.S. cement industry in the 1980s. These cases accord with and provide plausibility to an
important idea underlying the e¢ ciency e¤ect: workers (collectively) overcome resistance to changes in their
work practices, as they expect such e¤orts to improve their rms competitive situation in an increasingly
competitive market.
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3.1. Organization
We consider a rm, called F , that can produce two di¤erent products, A and B (also referred
to as segments or markets), solely using human capital. Specically, production requires a
CEO and a worker; both are indi¤erent to risk. The worker can make investments in human
capital (e.g., the worker can exert e¤ort to acquire new skills, learn and adopt new work
practices, etc.) that allow the rm to become more protable in segment A (e.g., the rm can
then produce A more e¢ ciently). Such investments are specic to segment A. Following the
workers investment decision, the prot-maximizing CEO chooses a strategy s 2 fA;ABg:
The CEO decides whether the rm diversies (denoted s = AB) or focuses on segment A
(denoted s = A).6 The rm chooses whether to produce both products simultaneously or
to specialize (focus) on just one product. The prot from producing in segment A depends
(among other things) on parameter cF 2 fc; c; cg; with c  c  c.7 For simplicity, we refer
to cF as the (marginal) cost of production (for A), but we could more generally interpret
fc; c; cg as production at low, medium, and high costs.
Without the workers specic investment the cost parameter is c. Specic investments
reduce costs di¤erentially, depending on the strategy chosen by the rm: If the rm chooses
s = A, the cost parameter becomes c; if it chooses s = AB; the cost parameter becomes c.
Intuitively, the worker cannot e¢ ciently use two di¤erent sets of skills; hence the rm cannot
fully exploit the workers A-specic skills if the worker also has to produce B. For example,
if the rm expands its scope by broadening its target market, the skills that were useful
to the (original) focused strategy may lose some of their value. Alternative interpretations
of this assumption are also possible. We could follow Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) and
6Focusing on B may also be a feasible choice. As we assume that the rm cannot become more e¢ cient in
B by fostering investment in B-specic skills, such a stratgy will only be optimal if prots in A are negative
(and the rm shuts down production for A): For convenience of exposition the latter case will be subsumed
under s = AB (see also Section 3.2).
7Strictly speaking, the assumption that c is greater than c is not necessary and is made only to improve
the exposition. This assumption reects the intuitive case in which specic skills cannot harm the rm, and
it also rules out the trivial case where the rm never benets from the workers investment (see also the
discussion in the next paragraph).
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interpret segment-specic investments as e¤ort to develop segment-specic ideas, which must
subsequently be implemented by the rm. In that case, a diversied rm might nd it more
di¢ cult to commit to implementing specic ideas, because it may have a larger set of projects
from which to choose.8
Formally, the worker has a binary choice variable y 2 f0; 1g with
y =
8><>: 1 if the worker undertakes A-specic investments,0 otherwise.
For simplicity, we assume that the CEO observes y.9 If the worker undertakes A-specic
investments and the rm is focused (i.e., if y = 1 and s = A), the worker receives an
exogenous benet that we normalize to 1. Otherwise, the worker earns zero benets. We
assume that y is not veriable (i.e., noncontractible); thus explicit incentive contracts that
reward workers for undertaking A-specic investments are not feasible. As in Van den Steen
(2005), this could be justied by the di¢ culty of describing the nature of such investments.
We provide an additional discussion of these contractibility assumptions in Subsection 5.4.
We call the cost of A-specic investments e¤ort e 2 (0; 1). E¤ort is a noncontractible
cost borne by the worker. As strategy implementation decisions are made after knowing
whether the worker has invested, the workers investment decision will depend on both e and
the workers belief regarding the likelihood of the CEO implementing s = A. Conditional on
y = 1, the worker believes that the focused strategy is implemented with some probability,
which we denote b 2 [0; 1]. More formally, b  Pr (s = A j y = 1). Clearly, the worker
8Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) discuss two models with such features. In the rst model, ideas generated
in one segment can also be used in the other segment. In such a case, ex post the rmmay choose to implement
inferior ideas to economize on implementation costs (e.g., incentive costs). In the second model, the rm is
nancially constrained and can only implement a limited number of ideas (because implementation is costly).
In both models, if the rm focuses on a segment, more and better ideas are implemented in that segment.
9The observability of y simplies the analysis, but it is not a necessary assumption. If y is not observable,
we have the same equilibrium that we describe below, as the CEO always knows y in any pure-strategy
equilibrium. However, such an equilibrium would not be unique; there could be less-e¢ cient equilibria in
which investment does not occur and the CEO always chooses to diversify. Thus, our assumption of the
observability of y can be alternatively interpreted as an equilibrium-selection device, which selects the most
e¢ cient equilibrium in a game in which y is not observable.
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undertakes A-specic investments if and only if b  e. The belief parameter b is a measure
of the credibility of the rms commitment to A. A larger b means that workers are more
likely to trust managers not to deviate from A, conditional on A-specic investments being
undertaken.
3.2. External environment
There is ex ante uncertainty regarding which of the two segments (A or B) will have higher
demand. Dene the random variable ~d with support fA;Bg as the demand shock, and let
 2 [0; 1] denote the probability that the realized value of ~d is d = A. We interpret  as
the probability that segment A experiences a positive demand shock that is larger than that
experienced by segment B.10
We dene competitive pressure as a random vector

~CA; ~CB

, where ~Cx 2 flx; hxg for
each x 2 fA;Bg. Cx = hx denotes high competitive pressure in segment x; Cx = lx denotes
low competitive pressure (Cx is the realization of ~Cx). Let x 2 [0; 1] denote the probability
of hx. For simplicity we assume that ~d, ~CA and ~CB are independently distributed. Let
CAA (d; cF ) denote the rms prot in segment A given the realized state (d; CA) and its
cost cF . Similarly, 
CB
B (d) denotes the rms prot in segment B given the realized state
(d; CB). Note that cF does not a¤ect prots in segment B simply because we assume that
the investment is specic to A. We state the assumed impact of cF and d on the prot
functions as:
Assumption 1 The following conditions hold:
1a. CAA (A; cF )  CAA (B; cF )  0 for all (cF ; CA).
1b. CBB (B)  CBB (A)  0 for all CB:
10Our general analysis does not require demand uncertainty; thus in some examples, we will ignore demand
shocks. Demand shocks are only necessary for a commitment problem to exist in the limiting case in which
rm F faces no competition (i.e., F is a monopolist). Because this is the standard case analyzed in the
related literature, we assume the existence of demand shocks only to highlight the fact that, in our model, the
commitment problem would exist even without competition. In the proof of Corollary 2 (in the Appendix),
we present an example in which a commitment problem exists in a pure monopoly case.
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1c. CAA (d; c)  CAA (d; c)  CAA
 
d; c

for all (d; CA):
Assumption 1 is merely denitional. Parts 1a and 1b state that prot is (weakly) larger
after a positive demand shock d. We assume non-negative prots to simplify the analysis,
although this is not a necessary condition for any of our results. It is a natural assumption
if the rm can (at zero cost) shut down unprotable divisions.11 Part 1c states that prot
is (weakly) decreasing in cost. Below, we demonstrate through examples that the aforemen-
tioned assumptions (in addition to being intuitive) are compatible with standard market
games and di¤erent notions/measures of competition.
3.3. Timing
The timing of events is as follows:
At period 0, the worker decides whether to invest (i.e., y = 0 or y = 1) and pays cost e
if y = 1.
At period 1, the CEO observes y. All uncertainty is fully resolved: Both the demand
shock d and the competitive pressure states CA and CB are realized and can be observed by
all.
At period 2, the CEO decides which strategy s 2 fA;ABg to implement. This decision
becomes common knowledge.
At period 3 the cost parameter cF is determined, production takes place, products are
sold in the market, and Fs prot is realized.
11Note that if prot in segment A is negative, the diversication strategy s = AB is interpreted as shutting
down Aor not focusing on A. If lBB (B) < 0, the CEO would always choose to focus on A (or to shut
down operations in all segments) and a commitment problem would not exist. In this case, the equilibrium
is trivial and uninteresting, but our results are still valid.
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3.4. Equilibrium
Our model represents a sequential game with incomplete information, and the equilibrium
concept used is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.12 At period 0, the worker chooses y
without knowing the realizations of d; CA and CB at period 0. At period 2, the CEO chooses
s after observing (y; d; CA; CB). Conditional on y = 0, the CEO chooses s = AB (because
CBB (d)  0). Conditional on y = 1, the CEOs optimal choice of strategy is a function
s (d; CA; CB) : fA;BgflA; hAgflB; hBg ! fA;ABg such that (we assume that the CEO
chooses A when indi¤erent):
s (d; CA; CB) =
8><>: A if 
CA
A (d; c)  CAA (d; c) + CBB (d) ;
AB else.
(1)
The CEOs strategy if y = 0 is irrelevant for the workers optimal investment decision, as
in that case the worker always receives zero. The workers optimal strategy depends on the
workers equilibrium belief b, which must be consistent with the CEOs optimal strategy
conditional on y = 1:
b = Pr [s (d; CA; CB) = A] ; (2)
where Pr [x] denotes the probability of x. The workers optimal decision y is then given by:
y =
8><>: 1 if b
  e;
0 if b < e:
(3)
An equilibrium is fully characterized by (b; y) and the CEOs equilibrium strategy, which
is given by (1) if y = 1 and s = AB if y = 0. The following proposition guarantees the
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium:
Proposition 1 For any set of parameters (e; ; A; B), a unique equilibrium exists.
12Although there is incomplete information, the informed party moves last; thus subgame-perfection is a
su¢ cient condition to guarantee sequential rationality.
13
4. Main Example: A Firm Facing Potential Entry
To x ideas, here we introduce our main example. In the next two sections, we will derive
general conditions for the main e¤ects illustrated by this example and apply these conditions
to other competition models.
Firm F has the ability to produce in segments A and B: Let cF denote the constant
marginal cost of producing A, with cF = 0 if there is investment and the rm only produces
A, and cF = c > 0 otherwise. In our general notation, c = 0 and c = c = c. Furthermore,
the rms marginal cost of production in B is always c. Demand in segment x is given by
the downward sloping demand function Y (P ) if d 6= x and by Y (P ) +  if d = x; where
 > 0 is a demand shifter that increases demand for x with probability . We assume that
monopoly prots (in all segments and for all possible levels of marginal costs and demand
congurations) are strictly positive.
At period 2 new competitors may enter either segment. Without loss of generality, we
assume that there is one potential entrant for each segment. Competition in x 2 fA;Bg is
low (Cx = lx) if the entrant in x has marginal cost c, and it is high (Cx = hx) if the potential
entrant in x has zero marginal cost. Both Fs CEO and the CEOs of the entrants observe
the realizations of cF , d, CA and CB before making their decisions. Firm F has a rst-mover
advantage; its CEO makes an irreversible decision of whether to focus on A or stay in/ enter
both segments (s = AB). This is followed by the entry decisions of the competitors, who
only enter segments in which they earn strictly positive payo¤s.
At period 3, if there is entry and two rms operate in the same segment, rms compete
on price by playing a Bertrand game. This implies that competitors only enter segments
in which F either is not active or has strictly higher marginal cost. In segments without
competition, a rm earns monopoly prots.
Ex post, Fs prot in x if Cx = lx (i.e., if F remains a monopolist) is 
lA
A (d; cF ) and
lBB (d), with 
lA
A (A; cF ) > 
lA
A (B; cF ) > 0 and 
lB
B (B) > 
lB
B (A) > 0. If CA = hA and
there is investment (y = 1), F can prevent entry in A by choosing to focus (s = A), as then
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cF = 0: Thus we have 
hA
A (d; 0) = 
lA
A (d; 0) > 
lA
A (d; c). Finally, if Cx = hx and cost is
cx = c > 0, entry in x occurs and we have 
hA
A (d; c) = 
hB
B (d) = 0. It is straightforward to
check that Assumption 1 holds.
The next proposition fully characterizes the unique equilibrium for all possible sets of
parameters for this example. Recall that x 2 [0; 1] denotes the probability of Cx = hx (and
1  x denotes the probability of Cx = lx).
Proposition 2 In the main example, for any set of parameters (e; ; A; B) a unique equi-
librium exists. The equilibrium belief b is weakly increasing in both A and B. The equilib-
rium is fully characterized by (3) and the following values for b:
1. b = 1; if lAA (A; c) + 
lB
B (A)  lAA (B; 0) ;
2. b =  + (1  ) (B + (1  B) A) ; if lAA (A; c) + lBB (A) 2

lAA (B; 0) ;
lA
A (A; 0)
i
and lAA (A; c)  lAA (B; 0);
3. b =  + (1  ) B; if lAA (A; c) + lBB (A) 2

lAA (B; 0) ;
lA
A (A; 0)
i
and lAA (A; c) >
lAA (B; 0) ;
4. b = B + (1  B) A; if lAA (A; c) + lBB (A) > lAA (A; 0) and lAA (A; c)  lAA (B; 0) ;
5. b = B + (1  B) A if lAA (A; c) + lBB (A) > lAA (A; 0) and lAA (A; c) > lAA (B; 0) :
In cases 2, 4 and 5, b is strictly increasing in both A and B.
Consider rst the e¤ect of B (competition in segment B) on b (the credibility of com-
mitment). This e¤ect is easily explained by the fact that tougher competition reduces the
expected protability of segment B, and thus makes the diversied strategy less attractive.
This is an example of the contestability e¤ect, which we will formally dene in the next
section.
Next, consider the e¤ect of A on b (e.g., in cases 2, 4 and 5). The advantage of being
focused is stronger when there is a potential entrant for A because, by being focused, F
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can deter entry and protect its monopoly prots.13 Thus, intuitively, as entry in A becomes
more likely (i.e., as A increases), the incumbent is more likely to focus (s = A) to become
more e¢ cient and deter entry in A. This is an example of the e¢ ciency e¤ect, which we will
also formally dene in the next section.
5. Competition and Commitment: General Results
Our main example illustrates a case in which competition (in either segment) unambiguously
fosters commitment. In this section, we consider the general model as described in Section
3. Our goal is to identify general conditions that give rise to the two e¤ects illustrated by
our main example.
5.1. The Contestability E¤ect
In our main example, an increase in competitive pressure due to entry in segment B elim-
inates prots in B, which decreases the value of diversication. Tougher competition in B
thus has a positive e¤ect on the credibility of commitment b. Here, we demonstrate that
this intuition is general: Whenever competition reduces protability in B, an increase in the
strength of competition increases commitment to s = A. We thus consider the following
condition:
Condition 1 For any given demand parameter d, (ex post) prot in segment B is (weakly)
decreasing in the level of competition:
lBB (d)  hBB (d) for all d 2 fA;Bg: (4)
13Using Fudenberg and Tiroles (1984) taxonomy of business strategies, focusing on A is a top dog
strategy: The incumbent increases its size in market A (because marginal costs fall) and looks toughto
potential entrants, thus e¤ectively deterring entry.
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Condition 1 is nearly as innocuous as Assumption 1; it simply states that competition
reduces prots.14 The natural denition of competition is, however, model-dependent; thus
in later examples, we need to check whether this condition holds for each case that we
analyze.
Under Condition 1, a focused strategy becomes more attractive when competitive pres-
sure in B increases. The following proposition describes the e¤ect of competitive pressure in
segment B on the equilibrium credibility of commitment b:
Proposition 3 (The Contestability E¤ect) Under Condition 1, the credibility of com-
mitment is (weakly) increasing in the strength of competition in segment B: b is (weakly)
increasing in B.
We call this positive e¤ect of B on the credibility of commitment the contestability
e¤ect. Intuitively, because increasing competition in B reduces prots in that segment, it
reduces the value of diversication and thus the focused strategy becomes relatively more
attractive. In other words, increasing competition in B reduces the ex ante value of the
option to diversify.
5.2. The E¢ ciency E¤ect
In our main example, the threat of entry in A also enhances the credibility of a focused
strategy. This happens because, without being focused, the rm could not generate prots
in A when there is an e¢ cient competitor, whereas under a focused strategy (and A-specic
investments), the rm earns monopoly prots, i.e., the impact of the focused strategy on the
rms prot in A is maximal in the more competitive scenario. This intuition can be gener-
alized. Conditional on segment-specic investments (y = 1), a focused strategy makes the
rm more e¢ cient (i.e., cost changes from c to c). Such an e¢ ciency improvement typically
makes the rm better able to compete. If that advantage is stronger when competition is
14We do not impose Condition 1 on segment A because it is not necessary for the analysis that follows.
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more intense, the rm is more likely to choose the focused strategy. Thus, we consider the
following condition:
Condition 2 For any given demand parameter d, improving cost e¢ ciency (i.e., changing
from c to c) is more valuable under high competitive pressure:
hAA (d; c)  hAA (d; c)  lAA (d; c)  lAA (d; c) for all d 2 fA;Bg: (5)
As we will illustrate below, in standard models of competition, Condition 2 is often
more demanding than Condition 1. This is because high competitive pressure in A may
signicantly reduce hAA (d; c) and 
hA
A (d; c). Hence, if the rms prot is always non-negative
(e.g., because it can shut down production in A), the left-hand side of (5) is very small.
Condition 2 is thus more likely to hold when this level e¤ect (i.e., the reduction of prot
levels due to competition) is not too large. Note that level of prots in segment A under
high cost is always non-negative under our (implicit) assumption that one may always quit
segment A. Thus, if hAA (d; c) = 0, Condition 2 never holds strictly and only holds weakly
if lAA (d; c) is also zero.
Under Condition 2, a focused strategy becomes more attractive when competitive pres-
sure in A increases, and we obtain the following:
Proposition 4 (The E¢ ciency E¤ect) Under Condition 2, the credibility of commitment
is (weakly) increasing in the strength of competition in segment A: b is (weakly) increasing
in A.
We call the positive e¤ect of A on the credibility of commitment the e¢ ciency e¤ect.15
15The term e¢ ciency e¤ect is also used in the IO literature to refer to a case in which a monopolist has
stronger incentives to invest in cost-reducing innovations than does a potential entrant (see e.g., Tirole, 1988,
p. 395).
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5.3. The Impact of Competition on Costs and Prots
Assuming that Conditions 1 and 2 hold, we now summarize some additional results in the
form of corollaries.
Because competition reduces the attractiveness of diversication, the worker is more
condent of being rewarded if he/she undertakes A-specic investments:
Corollary 1 The threat of tougher competition (i.e., an increase in A or B) fosters
strategy-specic investments.
Another interesting result is that competition can have a positive e¤ect on prots. Specif-
ically, an increase in competition may lead to a discontinuous increase in e¤ort and thus to
a discontinuous decline in costs. This occurs if competition changes b from just below e to
just above e. In some cases, prots under su¢ ciently intense competition are larger than
those in the absence of any competition:
Corollary 2 The threat of tougher competition may increase Fs prots. In particular, a
situation in which F faces some competition can be more protable than no competition.
Intuitively, an increase in competition can solve the CEOs commitment problem and
induce investments in a more e¢ cient cost structure. Competition often reduces expected
prots everywhere but at b = e, where prots jump upwards because of the elimination of
ine¢ ciencies.
In addition, the workers expected payo¤ is zero for b < e and b   e for b  e and
is thus increasing in competition for b  e. Thus, total production e¢ ciency, as given by
the sum of the workers and the rms payo¤s, may also strictly increase. This proves the
following corollary:
Corollary 3 The threat of tougher competition may increase the workers surplus and total
production e¢ ciency.
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An interesting application of these results is that competition may increase productiv-
ity and protability. These results suggest one (but not the only) channel through which
competition can make rms more e¢ cient.16
5.4. Contractibility Assumptions
As in the related literature, some degree of contractual incompleteness is necessary for our
model to work. We have chosen the simplest possible setup to facilitate the exposition. Here,
we provide a brief discussion of the key contractibility assumptions. We note, however, that
many of the conclusions of our model are robust to di¤erent assumptions that allow for
varying degrees of imperfect contractibility. We do not pursue such extensions here; these
extensions are uninteresting and distract us from our main goal.
Commitment. Due to frictions in the contracting environment, we assume that the
CEO is unable to commit to a given strategy at period 0, i.e., before the realizations of cost
and demand conditions, and is thus subject to potential dynamic inconsistency problems.
That is, by assumption, we exclude any kind of contractual solution that would commit the
CEO to a given strategy. Commitment problems are at the core of our model; thus we are
only interested in cases in which contractual solutions for these problems are not possible
(or are imperfect). This assumption is standard in the related literature, which is reviewed
in Section 2. This assumption is also particularly realistic in our application, as concepts
of strategyand strategy-specic investmentsare vague and di¢ cult to describe ex ante
in formal contracts, although they might, to some extent, be observable and even easily
understood by all agents.
In a similar vein, explicit contracts based on implementation decisions (i.e., cost re-
ductions from c to c) are also not possible. Clearly, such contracts would allow for perfect
commitment, and thus if these contracts are possible, commitment problems do not arise.
16The idea that a rm may use the strength of its competitors to its own advantage is known as judo
e¤ects.See Gelman and Salop (1983) for an early example and Yo¢ e and Kwak (2002) for a discussion of
related ideas in strategy.
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Here the intuition is the same as before; concepts such as cost-saving practicesor pro-
ductivity gainsmight be observable ex post but di¢ cult to describe ex ante.
Incentive compensation. Although explicit contracts on cost savings and strategy
implementation decisions are di¢ cult to write and enforce, the rm may indirectly achieve
the same outcome by contracting on objective performance measures. For example, in the
current version of the model, the problem of incentivizing segment-specic investments could
be solved by o¤ering the worker some performance-based compensation, e.g., the worker
could be o¤ered a share of the prots. In practice, however, such contracts may not be
su¢ cient, for a number of reasons. For example, prot-sharing may be costly to the rm
(i.e., prot sharing may leave rents to workers) if workers are protected by limited liability
and have limited initial wealth to pay entry fees.17 Introducing such frictions into the model
is straightforward but requires more structure and notation without providing benets.18
6. Applicability and Di¤erent Notions of Competition
In this section, we consider three standard market games as subgames in period 3. In
particular, we consider market games in which high competitive pressure is dened as a
state such that: (i) there is a large number of competitors, (ii) product substitutability
is high or (iii) rms compete on prices (Bertrand-style) rather than quantities (Cournot-
style). Because we abstract from demand shocks, we drop all references to d for notational
simplicity. All derived insights remain valid if we allow for demand uncertainty, as in the
general framework of the previous section. In all examples that follow, it can be easily
veried that Assumption 1 holds.
17This is a standard result in optimal contracting models under risk neutrality and limited liability (see,
e.g., La¤ont and Martimort, 2002).
18In particular, we would need to introduce yet another layer of uncertainty that would only be resolved
at the end of period 3.
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6.1. Number of Competitors
We model strategic interaction as Cournot competition, i.e., in each segment, rms simulta-
neously choose output quantities for a homogeneous good. Fs marginal cost of production
in A is given by cA 2 fc; c; cg; c < c; in B it is always cB = c. That is, its cost is cA = c if
y = 1 and s = A and cA = c otherwise. We do not make any assumptions on c: All other
rms have constant marginal costs of c  c: Cost c may be higher or lower than c, i.e., F
may or may not be in a disadvantageous position in the industry.
Prices are given by a symmetric system of inverse demand functions: Px =    Yx;
x 2 fA;Bg, where Yx denotes total industry output in x and Px denotes the market price.
To guarantee strictly positive output levels, we require  > max(c; c). The total number of
rms in x is given by nx 2 fn; ng with 2  n < n. In state Cx = lx, there are n rms in
x, and in state Cx = hx, there are n rms in x. To guarantee that all rms receive positive
prots in equilibrium, we require the additional technical assumptions that nc  +(n  1) c
and c  c <   c.
Fs equilibrium prot is given by19
Cxx (c) =
[  c+ nx (c  c)]2
(nx + 1)
2 and 
CA
A (c) =
[  c+ nA (c  c)]2
(nA + 1)
2 :
It is easy to see that Condition 1 holds because @
CB
B (c)
@nB
< 0. Thus, the contestability
e¤ect implies that competition in segment B fosters commitment.
To verify Condition 2, note that
@CAA (cA)
@nA
=   2
(nA + 1)
2
q
CAA (cA)| {z } [(  c)  (c  cA)]| {z }
level e¤ect competitive advantage e¤ect
;
where cA is either c or c. Note that cA has two opposing e¤ects on this derivative. Low cost
cA = c reduces the competitive advantage e¤ect (as dened above), which attenuates the neg-
19The calculation is standard and can be found in Belleamme and Peitz (2010), p.55.
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ative e¤ect of competition on prots. However, low-cost rms also have larger prots for any
given level of competition, which implies a stronger level e¤ect (as dened above), which in
turn amplies the negative e¤ect of competition on prots. Intuitively, tougher competition
may have a stronger negative e¤ect on prots for low-cost rms precisely because these rms
begin at a higher prot level. Whether Condition 2 holds depends on the relative contribution
of these two e¤ects. In particular, the level e¤ect is dominated when competition is not exces-
sively strong. Specically, algebra reveals that if n < (a  c) = [(a  c)  (c  c)  (c  c)],
the competitive advantage e¤ect dominates the level e¤ect.20 We conclude that, in this
example, the e¢ ciency e¤ect is more likely to be of rst-order importance if there are few
incumbent rivals in the industry.
6.2. Product Substitutability
Here, we model strategic interaction as Cournot competition with heterogeneous goods. F
faces exactly one competitor in each of the two segments. Fs marginal cost of production
cx in segment x 2 fA;Bg is as in the previous example, whereas each competitor has a
marginal cost of production of c. The price and quantity of the product of rm i in segment
x are denoted pix and y
i
x, respectively. The inverse demand system is given by
piA =   yiA   Ay iA ;
piB =   yiB   By iA ; (6)
where x, x 2 fA;Bg, is the degree of substitutability between the goods of the two rms
in each segment. We set x =  in state Cx = hx and x =  in state Cx = lx, with
20This is similar to results in Vives (2008), who shows that increasing the number of rms tends to decrease
the value of a cost reduction, as its negative impact on a rms demand (which is similar to our level e¤ect)
dominates its positive impact on a rms elasticity of demand (which resembles our competitive advantage
e¤ect).
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0   <  < 1. Equilibrium prots for F are:21
Cxx (c) =

  c
x + 2
2
and CAA (c) =

2 (  c)  A (  c)
4  2A
2
:
Again, the contestability e¤ect holds because @
CB
B (c)
@B
< 0, which implies Condition 1. To
verify Condition 2, note that (after some algebra):
@
@A
 
CAA (c)  CAA (c)

=
4 (c  c) [4A (  c)  (4  4A + 32A) (  c)]
(4  2A)3
;
which is positive if and only if A is su¢ ciently large. The e¢ ciency e¤ect thus holds for
su¢ ciently large  because higher product substitutability is less of a problem for low-cost
rms; more e¢ cient rms nd it easier to steal customers from competitors as products
become more substitutable.22 That is, as product substitutability increases, the competitive
advantage e¤ect becomes stronger and may eventually o¤set the level e¤ect.
6.3. Price and Quantity Competition
Competition in prices (i.e., Bertrand competition) is typically ercer than competition in
quantities (Cournot competition).23 Here we use the setup and notation of the previous
subsection with A = B =  2 [0; 1). In state Cx = lx , i.e., when rms in segment x play
a Cournot game, Fs equilibrium prots are
lxx (c) =

  c
 + 2
2
and lAA (c) =

2 (  c)   (  c)
4  2
2
:
21The calculation is very similar to that in Belleamme and Peitz (2010), Section 3.3.2.
22More precisely, the e¤ect holds if  23( c)

2  c  c 
q
2 (  c) (c  c) + (  c)2

: Again, our
results are similar to those found in Vives (2008), who shows that higher product substitutability tends to
increase the value of a cost reduction.
23We can interpret Cournot competition as competition in capacity-constrained markets (see Kreps and
Scheinkman, 1983).
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In state Cx = hx rms compete by simultaneously setting prices and the resulting demand
is given by the inverse of (6). Firm Fs equilibrium prots are given by
hxx (c) =
(  c)2 (1  )
( + 1) (   2)2 and 
hA
A (c) =
[(2  2) (  c)   (  c)]2
(4  2)2 (1  2) :
Because of hBB (c) lBB (c) < 0, Condition 1 and the contestability e¤ect hold, and the
credibility of commitment is enhanced by competition in B.
To verify Condition 2, note that (after some algebra)
hAA (c)  hAA (c) 
h
lAA (c)  lAA (c)
i
=
3 (c  c) [ (  c)  (2  ) (  c)]
(1  2) (4  2)2 ;
the sign of which is in principle ambiguous. Condition 2 is satised if the degree of product
substitutability  is su¢ ciently high, i.e. if   2 (  c) = (2  c  c).
7. Competition versus Leadership Styles
As discussed in the literature review in Section 2, certain leadership styles may improve the
rms ability to commit to a given strategy. In light of our previous results, an interesting
question is how competition interacts with leadership styles.
Similar to previous papers (e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000; Bolton, Brunnermeier,
and Veldkamp, 2013), we now assume that there are two possible types of CEOs, each of
whom has a di¤erent leadership style l 2 ff; vg: a CEO can be either exible (type f) or
committed (type v - for visionary). The CEOs leadership style is common knowledge. A
exible CEO always selects the strategy that maximizes expected prots at period 2, without
any bias towards either A or AB (i.e., a exible CEO behaves as in the previous sections).
In particular, a exible CEO cannot credibly commit to either A or AB. In contrast,
a committed CEO credibly commits either to strategy s = A or to strategy s = AB,
independent of the realizations of d; CA and CB. Such a commitment is possible either
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because the CEO has biased preferences towards a specic strategy or because the CEOs
beliefs concerning the protability of a given strategy di¤er from the beliefs of the market
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000; Van den Steen, 2005).
We use our main example of a monopolist facing potential entry (discussed in Section
4), and for brevity of exposition, we assume  = 0 and that the conditions for Case 2 in
Proposition 2 hold. In this case, both the contestability e¤ect and the e¢ ciency e¤ect are
at work. Also for brevity of exposition, here we only consider the non-trivial case in which
a committed leader is committed to s = A.
If l = v (i.e., the CEO is committed to A), then the worker expects s = A with probability
one, in which case the worker always invests because e < 1. The expected prot v is
independent of A and B (as 
hA
A (B; 0) = 
lA
A (B; 0)), thus v = 
lA
A (B; 0). Competition
has no e¤ect on prot under a committed CEO; if the CEO credibly commits to A, no entry
in A occurs.
Full commitment may not be optimal. Thus, if the shareholders of the rm could choose
the style of the CEO, they would need to compare v with the expected prot under a
exible CEO:
f =
8><>: (A + B   AB) 
lA
A (B; 0) + (1  B) (1  A)

lAA (B; c) + 
lB
B (B)

; if y = 1
(1  A) lAA (B; c) + (1  B) lBB (B) ; if y = 0
:
The optimal leadership style depends on the credibility of commitment b, which in turn
depends on A and B. If b is su¢ ciently large, such that investment is always undertaken
under a exible CEO (i.e., if b  e), a exible CEO is trivially superior to a committed
CEO: The investment is undertaken under either CEO, but only the exible CEO maximizes
prot ex post. In contrast, if b < e, the exible CEO cannot motivate workers to invest.
The following proposition summarizes these observations:
Proposition 5 Assume that the conditions of Case 2 of Proposition 2 hold. If A + B  
AB  e, the optimal choice of leadership style is given by l = f . If A + B   AB < e,
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the optimal style may be either f or v, and the benet of employing a exible leader relative
to that of employing a committed leader, f   v, is decreasing in both A and B.
Proposition 5 provides an intuitive summary of the trade-o¤ between commitment and
exibility and its implications for the optimality of leadership styles. Committed leaders o¤er
full commitment. Full commitment is desirable only when (i) investment cannot be achieved
without full commitment and (ii) the value of ex post adaptation is low. Investment can be
achieved without full commitment if competition (i.e., A; B) is high, i.e. if A+B AB 
e. Thus, if competition is su¢ ciently strong, leadership exibility is optimal.
For lower levels of competition (A + B   AB < e), either exible or committed lead-
ership may be optimal. Conditional on A + B   AB < e, f   v is decreasing in both
A and B. Thus we can have a non-monotonic relationship between competition and lead-
ership styles. First, under very intense competition, investment without full commitment
is possible, and thus exible leadership is optimal. Second, under moderate competition,
investment is not possible without a fully committed leader. Thus, if commitment is more
valuable than exibility, it is optimal to employ a committed CEO. Finally, if competition
is very weak, the diversication strategy becomes more protable, eventually making the
employment of a exible CEO optimal.
8. Concluding Remarks
There are some directions in which our model can be extended. First, our analysis similarly
applies to cases in which strategy-specic investments improve protability by increasing
demand rather than by reducing costs. Second, it is possible to generalize our model to
situations in which commitment also serves as a coordination device. In such an extension,
to induce strategy-specic investments, competitive pressure must be stronger than that in
the case of no coordination frictions.24
24Both such extensions can be found in on-line appendixes available at the authorswebsites.
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Our analysis provides clear predictions that could be assessed using data. The main
empirical implication of the contestability e¤ect is that, when faced with increasing compe-
tition in a given segment or market for which e¢ ciency improvements are di¢ cult to obtain, a
multi-market rm: (i) eventually leaves that market and (ii) becomes more e¢ cient in the re-
maining markets in which it operates. Furthermore, a rm operating in one market becomes
more e¢ cient if competition increases in other markets. The main empirical implication of
the e¢ ciency e¤ect is that, when faced with increasing competition in a given market for
which e¢ ciency improvements are possible, a multi-market rm: (i) focuses more on that
market (i.e., ceases operating in other markets) and (ii) becomes more e¢ cient in the market
in which competition has increased. The e¢ ciency e¤ect is more likely to be observed in
certain industries, such as those with few exogenous barriers to entry, few incumbent rivals,
and high product substitutability.
The related empirical literature, which we briey review, reports some evidence that is
consistent with such e¤ects. However, this evidence is not unequivocal; it is only suggestive.
We hope that future work will test the implications of the model more directly.
A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The uniqueness and existence of equilibrium follow directly from the fact that, for any set of
parameters (e; ; A; B), the problem can be solved recursively: The rms optimal strategy
conditional on y = 1 is uniquely determined by the prot functions according to (1), which
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then implies that belief b is uniquely dened by (2) and (1):
b = AB (1 [s (A; hA; hB) = A] + (1  )1 [s (B; hA; hB) = A]) (7)
+ (1  A) B (1 [s (A; lA; hB) = A] + (1  )1 [s (B; lA; hB) = A])
+A (1  B) (1 [s (A; hA; lB) = A] + (1  )1 [s (B; hA; lB) = A])
+ (1  A) (1  B) (1 [s (A; lA; lB) = A] + (1  )1 [s (B; lA; lB) = A]) ;
where 1 [x] is an indicator function that equals 1 if x is true and zero otherwise. Once b is
computed, (3) gives the workers optimal decision y. The rms optimal strategy conditional
on y = 0 is s = AB.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Existence and uniqueness follow from Proposition 1. First note that (as Y (P ) does not
depend on the segment x) we have lAA (A; c) + 
lB
B (A) = 
lA
A (B; c) + 
lB
B (B) ; 
lA
A (A; 0) >
lBB (A) and 
lA
A (A; c) = 
lB
B (B) :
Case 1: if y = 1 the rm can guarantee a prot of at least lAA (B; 0) = 
hA
A (B; 0) by
focusing on A. As this prot is larger than the best-case scenario under diversication
(lAA (A; c) + 
lB
B (A)), the rm always selects A over AB, which implies that b
 = 1.
Case 2: We rst note that if CB = hB, 
hB
B (d) = 0, and the CEO chooses the focused
strategy regardless of the realization of d and CA, i.e., s (d; CA; hB) = A. If d = A and
CB = lB, we nd that (from the conditions that dene this case):
lAA (A; 0)  lAA (A; c) + lBB (A)) s (A; lA; lB) = A;
hAA (A; 0) = 
lA
A (A; 0)  lBB (A)) s (A; hA; lB) = A;
which implies s = A with probability 1 if d = A. If d = B, we have that s (B;CA; hB) = A
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as argued above, and (from the conditions that dene this case):
lAA (B; 0) < 
lA
A (A; c) + 
lB
B (A) = 
lA
A (B; c) + 
lB
B (B)) s (B; lA; lB) = AB;
hAA (B; 0) = 
lA
A (B; 0)  lAA (A; c) = lBB (B)) s (B; hA; lB) = A;
which implies s = A with probability B+(1  B) A. Thus, we have b = +(1  ) (B + (1  B) A).
Case 3: This is identical to Case 2, except that when d = B and (CA; CB) = (hA; lB), the
rm now chooses s = AB. Thus we have b = + (1  ) B.
Case 4: This is identical to Case 2, except that when d = A and (CA; CB) = (lA; lB), the
rm now chooses s = AB. Thus, regardless of d, the probability of s = A is B +(1  B) A
and we have b = B + (1  B) A.
Case 5: This is identical to Case 4, except that when d = B and (CA; CB) = (hA; lB), the
rm now chooses s = AB. Thus, the probability of s = A is b =  [B + (1  B) A] +
(1  ) B = B +  (1  B) A.
Proof of Corollary 1
It follows immediately from the e¤ects of A and B on b (Propositions 3 and 4) and from
(3).
Proof of Corollary 2.
We construct an example that demonstrates both claims. Assume the setup of Section 4
and Case 3 of Proposition 2 with lAA (A; c) + 
lB
B (A) < 
lA
A (A; 0).
25 Suppose initially that
A = B = 0 (the rm is a monopolist and faces no threat of entry). We have b = , thus if
 < e, Fs expected prot is lAA (A; c) + 
lB
B (A)  M , that is, under monopoly and  < e,
workers exert no e¤ort and the rm always diversies.
Holding A = 0, our goal is to nd a set of parameters e; B > 0 and  > e such that the
25For example, these assumptions hold if we have Y (P ) =    P;  > c;  > c and 2 < (+    c)2 +
(  c)2 < (+ )2, which can always be fullled by choosing a su¢ ciently large value for .
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rms expected prot  under these parameters exceeds M . Let
 = 0  
lA
A (A; c) + 
lB
B (A)  lAA (B; 0)
lAA (A; 0)  lAA (B; 0)
;
which is strictly less than 1 because lAA (A; c)+
lB
B (A) < 
lA
A (A; 0). Choose any e 2 (0; 1).
Let B 2 T 

e 0
1 0 ; 1

, i.e., we have 0 + (1  0) B  e for B 2 T . We have that,
for B 2 T , focusing on A is optimal if d = A (as lAA (A; 0) > lAA (A; c) + lBB (A)).
If d = B, diversication is optimal if CB = lB (as 
lA
A (B; 0) < 
lA
A (A; c) + 
lB
B (A) =
lAA (B; c) + 
lB
B (B))), and focusing on A is optimal if CB = hB (as 
hB
B (B) = 0). Thus
 = 0lAA (A; 0) + (1  0) BlAA (B; 0) + (1  0) (1  B)

lAA (B; c) + 
lB
B (B)

:
Now, take the limit of  as B goes to 1:
lim
B!1
 = 0lAA (A; 0) + (1  0) lAA (B; 0) = lAA (A; c) + lBB (A) = M .
As  is decreasing in B 2 T , we have that for any B 2 T ,  > M .
Proof of Proposition 3
From (7), we obtain
@b
@B
= A (1 [s (A; hA; hB) = A]  1 [s (A; hA; lB) = A]) +
A (1  ) (1 [s (B; hA; hB) = A]  1 [s (B; hA; lB) = A]) +
(1  A)  (1 [s (A; lA; hB) = A]  1 [s (A; lA; lB) = A]) +
(1  A) (1  ) (1 [s (B; lA; hB) = A]  1 [s (B; lA; lB) = A]) :
Because s (d; CA; lB) = A) CAA (d; c)+lBB (d)  CAA (d; c)) (because of (4)) CAA (d; c)+
hBB (d)  CAA (d; c)) s (d; CA; hB) = A implies 1 [s (d; CA; hB) = A]  1 [s (d; CA; lB) = A]
for all (d; CA) 2 fA;Bg  flA; hAg, we have that @b@B is always nonnegative.
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Proof of Proposition 4
From (7), we obtain
@b
@A
= B (1 [s (A; hA; hB) = A]  1 [s (A; lA; hB) = A]) +
B (1  ) (1 [s (B; hA; hB) = A]  1 [s (B; lA; hB) = A]) +
(1  B)  (1 [s (A; hA; lB) = A]  1 [s (A; lA; lB) = A]) +
(1  B) (1  ) (1 [s (B; hA; lB) = A]  1 [s (B; lA; lB) = A]) :
Because of s (d; lA; CB) = A) lAA (d; c)+CBB (d)  lAA (d; c)) (because of (5))hAA (d; c)+
CBB (d)  hAA (d; c)) s (d; hA; CB) = A we obtain 1 [s (d; hA; CB) = A]  1 [s (d; lA; CB) = A]
for all (d; CB) 2 fA;Bg  flB; hBg, and thus @b@A is always nonnegative.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Under a exible CEO, we obtain b = B + (1  B) A (see the proof Case 2 of Proposition
2). Thus, if B +(1  B) A  e, the worker chooses y = 1. Thus, a exible CEO is trivially
superior to a committed CEO: Investment occurs under either CEO, but the exible CEO
maximizes prot ex post, whereas the committed CEO does not.
If B + (1  B) A < e, the exible CEO cannot motivate the worker to invest in A-
specic skills. As v = 
lA
A (B; 0) < 
lA
A (B; c) + 
lB
B (B), the optimal style can be either
l = v or l = f depending on the specications of the model. Because v is independent of
A and B, f   v is strictly decreasing in both A and B:
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